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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE
ABSTRACT
National corporate-governance traditions are distinctive, deeply rooted, and difficult to change.
 Recent research points to a country's legal traditions and its stage of economic development as
important determinants of corporate-governance institutions.  Common-law countries tend to provide
more explicit investor protections than civil-law countries.  Richer countries tend to enforce corporate
law more strictly.  Broader and deeper financial markets emerge in the presence of strong investor
protections, fostering more outside financing and better corporate financial performance.  Corporate-
governance systems also influence resident firms' capital structures and ownership structures.  A
broader perspective on corporate performance suggests that no country's system of corporate
governance is without shortcomings, however.2
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE
Corporate-governance mechanisms assure investors in corporations that they will receive
adequate returns on their investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  If these mechanisms did not exist or
did not function properly, outside investors would not lend to firms or buy their equity securities. 
Businesses would be forced to rely entirely on their own internally generated cash flows and
accumulated financial resources to finance ongoing operations as well as profitable investment
opportunities.  Overall economic performance likely would suffer because many good business
opportunities would be missed and temporary financial problems at individual firms would spread
quickly to other firms, employees, and consumers.
This paper investigates the links between distinctive national systems of corporate governance
and the performance of firms and economies that employ them.  We first review the recently released
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, an initiative designed to increase awareness of governance
issues and to disseminate information on best practices.  Then we describe the world's predominant
corporate-governance traditions and discuss the historical and legal roots of these traditions.  We then
trace the effects of different corporate-governance traditions on the development of financial systems
broadly defined, including such things as the amount of external financing that firms typically do and in
what form they obtain funds from investors (e.g., debt or equity, bank debt or bond-market debt). 
Finally, we provide evidence on the effectiveness of each of the major systems of corporate governance
in producing favorable economic outcomes both at the firm level and for national economies as a
whole.  We also consider reasons why traditional profit- or economic growth-based indicators of
performance may be inadequate for analyzing the complexities surrounding a country's
corporate-governance environment.3
To preview our conclusions briefly, we find that corporate-governance traditions are
distinctive, deeply rooted, and difficult to change.  Some sets of corporate-governance institutions
appear to encourage or support broad financial-system development more than others, which in turn
may have consequences for the types of firms that can access public capital markets.  Financial-system
development may also have implications for long-term economic growth, although this link remains
controversial.  At the same time, corporate-governance systems in some countries may excel in respects
other than fostering capital markets, such as providing long-term financial stability and opportunities
for intertemporal risk-sharing.  In sum, there appears to be no "perfect" system, so we view continued
diversity among corporate-governance systems as unsurprising.  Nevertheless, there is limited evidence
of convergence among corporate-governance systems around the world.
THE CAMPAIGN FOR BETTER CORPORATE-GOVERNANCE PRACTICES
We begin with a case study that documents persistent cross-country differences in the
profitability of large internationally active commercial banks.  This simple example is designed to
motivate our search for the causes of underlying differences in corporate-governance environments
around the world.  Then we discuss a newly released set of corporate-governance principles.  The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a grouping of 29 industrialized
and newly industrializing countries, recently published a set of corporate-governance standards and
guidelines covering five major areas:  (1) the rights of shareholders, (2) the equitable treatment of
shareholders, (3) the role of stakeholders in corporate governance, (4) disclosure and transparency, and
(5) the responsibilities of the board (OECD, 1999a).  The OECD document highlights the increased
profile that governance issues have attained around the world.  In part, the renewed focus on
governance can be traced to the immediate challenges facing policymakers and business leaders in
emerging markets and transition economies.  It is also the case, however, that the globalization of4
financial markets more generally has brought into sharp relief the sometimes significant differences that
exist among advanced market economies with respect to shareholder rights, creditor rights, and the
legal enforcement environment.
Why Corporate-Governance Practices Matter:  The Case of Bank Profitability
Comprehensive cross-country and cross-industry comparisons of corporate performance are
extremely difficult to carry out and to interpret.  We focus instead on the core profitability of one part of
a single sector, namely, large internationally active commercial banks.  Although regulatory regimes
and local competitive conditions differ across countries, our narrow focus on an internationally
comparable performance ratio pre-tax return on assets, or ROA allows us to explore the hypothesis
that persistent cross-country differences might be attributable to differences in the incentives and
controls facing managers.  Given that investors in all countries prefer the highest return possible,
persistently inefficient use of corporate assets is an indication that the prevailing corporate-governance
system has not aligned the interests of managers and owners adequately.
TABLE 1 HERE
Table 1 provides snapshots of the core profitability of large internationally active commercial
banks from 12 countries for two three-year periods.  The first row of panel A shows the average pre-tax
return on assets of the largest banks in each group of countries sampled over 1986-88, while the second
row gives the individual country detail (the reason for grouping countries in this way will become
evident below.)  Pre-tax ROAs vary a lot across countries, particularly in view of the tiny margins
facing large banks.  Panel B of Table 1 provides the same information viewed exactly ten years later. 
Panel C shows the averages over the two three-year periods taken together.
The most striking pattern in the table is that pre-tax ROAs in the first column (including the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada) tend to be higher than those in other columns.  It is5
less obvious what differences, if any, exist between the countries or country groups in columns two,
three, and four.  Likewise, it is difficult to make any general statement about the relative profitability of
large banks in the U.S., the U.K., and Canada.  The questions we confront immediately are therefore: 
What's different about the English-speaking countries vis-à-vis the other countries? and What is similar
among the English-speaking countries?  We would also like to learn if there are differences between the
remaining countries, given that they constitute a diverse group themselves.
Before investigating these questions, we introduce the core standards and guidelines
recommended recently by the OECD to promote harmonization in and improvement of
corporate-governance systems around the world.
TABLE 2 HERE
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
The OECD's recommended principles of corporate governance are listed in Table 2 along with
a brief commentary highlighting what we think are some of their most noteworthy elements.  Five areas
of concern are covered:  (1) the rights of shareholders, (2) the equitable treatment of shareholders, (3)
the role of stakeholders in corporate governance, (4) disclosure and transparency, and (5) the
responsibilities of the board.
The major thrusts of the OECD principles are for better disclosure of important information to
shareholders and vigorous protection of shareholder interests, especially those who hold a minority
interest or are located abroad.  The report stops short of advocating far-reaching reforms of existing
systems of corporate governance or legal systems even though it recognizes significant shortcomings in
some countries.  These shortcomings are arguably entrenched in the governance environment in some
countries, however, so it is not clear how effective a set of voluntary guidelines such as these might be.
 Examples of serious impediments to greater compliance with the OECD guidelines include deviations6
from one share-one vote corporate charters and a board that is effectively dominated by the firm's
managers or a minority shareholder.
The OECD principles represent a compromise in a number of dimensions.  There is a clear
advocacy of greater shareholder rights, but the stakeholder view of corporate governance is also
acknowledged (if not endorsed).  Yet, is not conflict inevitable between these two perspectives in
practice?  How is a country or an individual firm to sort out the competing priorities of shareholder- and
stakeholder-based systems of governance?
1  The OECD document suggests that shareholders may
benefit in the long run from a concern with stakeholder interests, but this provides little guidance in the
short term in the real world of corporate decisionmaking.
In another instance of ambiguity, minority and foreign shareholders are held up for special
mention as deserving better treatment than they sometimes receive.  However, the OECD calls merely
for disclosing, rather than eliminating, the corporate-governance practices that put these shareholders at
a disadvantage.  These practices include unequally weighted voting classes and other capital structures
(e.g., pyramids composed of multiple holding companies each with a controlling interest but less than
full ownership in the company at the level below it) that give certain shareholders control rights that are
disproportionate to their share of contributed capital.  Foreign and minority shareholders have little
reason to expect that the mere publication of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance will
greatly enhance their property rights.  Fundamental reforms must be enacted in individual countries in
the face of what is likely to be strong resistance by parties well-served by the current system.
Finally, creditors are obliquely mentioned in the principles in the context of non-shareholder
stakeholders in the firm, but no specific recommendations are made to enhance creditor rights in
countries where these are neglected (we provide evidence of this below).  We will give special
emphasis below to the importance of creditor rights in an overall framework of adequate7
corporate-governance practices and institutions.  It is to the fundamentals that underlie the visible
framework of corporate governance that we now turn.
LEGAL TRADITIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW
Despite their universal importance and a considerable international exchange of ideas and
institutions, corporate-governance systems differ, even among advanced market economies.  Perhaps
the most important cause of international diversity among corporate-governance systems is the
existence of several distinctive legal traditions across countries (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer,
and Vishny, 1998, henceforth LLSV 1998).  These traditions shape the specific rights and protections
investors enjoy in their interactions with firms.  In addition, the extent to which contracts are legally
enforced what we will call the rule of law also influences how effective corporate governance is in a
particular country.
This section describes the major legal traditions in existence today and sketches their impact on
creditor and shareholder rights.  We also discuss cross-country measures of the enforcement of the rule
of law as it applies to investors.  We summarize the adequacy of creditor rights, shareholder rights, and
the enforcement climate in each of the major country groupings proposed by LLSV (1998) to come up
with an overall ranking of the corporate-governance environments in which firms operate around the
world.  Finally, following LLSV (1998), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997a,
henceforth LLSV 1997a), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999, henceforth LLS 1999),
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Levine (1998, 1999), we argue that the legal and political
environments are critical influences on the nature of corporate governance and thereby on corporate
performance in every country.
1 For example, Gorton and Schmid (1999) find that worker codetermination in German firms the
statutory right of employees to sit on corporate supervisory boards exerts a negative impact on
shareholder value.8
Legal Traditions
What are the key features of a legal tradition that define and differentiate it from other
traditions?  LLSV (1998) cite comparative legal scholars who have identified six criteria:
Among the criteria often used for this purpose are the following:  (1) historical
background and development of the legal system, (2) theories and hierarchies of sources
of law, (3) the working methodology of jurists within the legal systems, (4) the
characteristics of legal concepts employed by the system, (5) the legal institutions of the
system, and (6) the divisions of law employed within a system (Glendon, Gordon, and
Osakwe, 1994, pp. 4-5).
Following this approach, legal scholars have concluded that the two most important broad legal
traditions are civil law and common law.  Other traditions exist that have the character of rule-based
systems of law such as Jewish law, Canon law, Hindu law, and Muslim law but LLSV (1998) argue
that religious and other quasi-legal traditions are not relevant for a cross-country study of investor
protection and corporate governance.
2
The common-law tradition is found in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, other
English-speaking countries, and countries whose modern development was heavily influenced by the
English-speaking world.  The civil-law tradition (or "Romano-Germanic" tradition) is found in
Continental Europe and other countries that were heavily influenced by Continental Europeans.  LLSV
(1998) further subdivide the civil-law tradition into three main branches:  (2a) the Scandinavian civil-
law tradition, (2b) the German civil-law tradition, and (2c) the French civil-law tradition.
TABLE 3 HERE
2 Interestingly, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997b) suggest in a different paper that
religious traditions  may be important, after all.  They find a strong positive link between "trust" by individuals of
other people and organizations in society and measures of government efficiency, participation in civic
organizations, social efficiency, and the size of business firms.  They argue that trust, in turn, is lower in
countries where the dominant religion is "hierarchical," including the Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and
Muslim religions.  Thus, differing religious traditions may be important in any search for ultimate determinants
of social systems and behaviors.9
Table 3 displays the LLSV (1998) classification scheme for the legal systems of 49 countries. 
Countries from all continents are included in the sample although great swathes of Asia, Africa, and
eastern Europe are absent.  Data limitations prevented LLSV from including the more than 100 other
countries that are in databases such as the Penn World Table, Mark 5 (Summers and Heston, 1991). 
Fortunately, the LLSV (1998) sample includes countries representing all the major legal familes.  The
sample countries also produce the vast majority of world economic output.  China and Russia are the
two largest and perhaps most important countries missing from the sample.
The four legal families are indicated along the horizontal dimension of the table and a rough
proxy for each country's stage of economic development is used to allocate countries vertically.  The
two largest legal groupings are those with corporate-governance traditions originating in England and
France.  The common-law grouping includes all the English-speaking members of the OECD as well as
former British colonies and protectorates plus Thailand.  The countries with French legal traditions
include several long-standing European OECD members, recent members Mexico and Turkey, plus
former French, Spanish, and Portuguese colonies in South America, Asia, and the Middle East.  The
Scandinavian and German legal traditions were not spread as widely around the world due to the
relatively small colonial empires these countries amassed.  It is interesting to note that China, Russia,
and most of eastern Europe are developing legal and financial systems most heavily influenced by the
German legal tradition.
Table 3 allows a first crude attempt to identify patterns among corporate-governance systems. 
First notice that the OECD and G-7 countries are fairly evenly spread across three of the four legal
traditions identified by LLSV (1998).  Thus, there is no monopoly by a single legal tradition among
rich countries today.  The distribution of countries not in the OECD (mostly former colonies of
European powers) is less uniform but is not dominated by any single legal tradition, either.  In sum, it is
not obvious how legal origins and broad economic performance are related.  We must examine each of10
these traditions more closely and ascertain what corporate-governance practices and financial-system
features are associated with them before we can draw any conclusions about whether and how corporate
governance and corporate performance are related.
The Common-Law Tradition.  The English common-law legal tradition is characterized by
judges trying to resolve particular cases.  That is, precedents from judicial decisions, rather than
contributions of legal scholars, shape common law.  While most of the common-law countries share a
common historical root in the English system and continue to apply a similar procedural approach to
the evolution of their respective bodies of law, subsequent independent development means that the
various national systems resemble each other less closely as time goes on.  Nevertheless, comparative
legal scholars generally agree that members of the common-law tradition share more critical features
with each other than with members of other legal families (LLSV, 1998).
The Civil-Law Tradition.  The civil, or "Romano-Germanic," legal tradition originates in
Roman law and thus is much older than the common-law tradition.  Civil law uses statutes and
comprehensive codes as the primary means of organizing its legal principles.  It relies on legal scholars
to interpret the code and draft new interpretations and rules rather than building on judicial precedents
alone (LLSV, 1998).  Having developed to some extent independently over many centuries, countries
within the broad civil-law tradition in some cases have diverged from each other more than have
countries within the common-law family.  Therefore, LLSV (1998) argue that the tripartite scheme of
subdividing civil-law countries mentioned above is appropriate.
The Scandinavian family of legal traditions has its roots in Roman law but in modern times
(since the 18
th century) the civil codes have not been used (LLSV, 1998).  In this respect, Scandinavian
law has converged some way toward common law.  Nevertheless, the origins of the Scandinavian legal11
system are in the civil-law tradition and quantitative measures of its protection of investors are most
similar to those of the German tradition.
3
The German Commercial Code was written in 1897.  It influenced the legal development of
Austria, Switzerland, Japan, Greece, and Italy, although LLSV (1998) assign the latter two countries to
the French group because they give priority to the origin of a country's legal tradition.  Legal
developments in South Korea and Taiwan were heavily influenced by Japan and China, respectively,
both of which in turn borrowed from the German legal system.  Other countries that show strong
influence from the German legal tradition include the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the former
Yugoslavia, although none of these countries are included in the LLSV sample due to their
underdeveloped private sectors.
The French Commercial Code was written under Napoleon in 1807 and was spread initially in
the wake of his conquests.  Later, French colonizers imposed French legal systems that still survive in
the Near East, Africa, southeast Asia, Oceania, and the French Caribbean islands.  The Spanish and
Portuguese empires in Latin America predated Napoleon, but their disintegration paved the way for the
introduction of modern French legal systems (LLSV, 1998).
Creditor Rights and Shareholder Rights
Legal traditions matter for corporate governance and corporate performance because they are
systematically related to patterns in the types of legal rights and protections provided to investors. 
These rights and protections, in turn, affect the types of financing available to firms and may encourage
the participation of some groups of investors more than others (such as banks, non-financial
corporations, or individuals).  It is to these specific rights and protections and their distribution across
countries that we now turn.
3 LLSV (1998, Tables 2 and 4) compute indexes of shareholder rights and creditor rights for each country in their
sample.  Tests of differences of means for various aspects of investor protections between the four legal12
Creditor rights.  LLSV (1998) point out that creditor rights are actually more complex than
shareholder rights in at least two respects.  First, there are typically multiple classes of creditors of large
firms, including secured and unsecured lenders, as well as senior and junior positions within a security
class.  Disagreements among creditors can literally tear apart a firm as secured and senior creditors
pursue their collateral while unsecured and junior creditors are much more likely to wish the firm to
continue as a going concern.  Related to this conflict is the second aspect of the complexity pointed out
by LLSV (1998).  In case of financial distress, creditors must somehow choose between two quite
distinct and risky strategies.  They can liquidate the firm, perhaps locking in losses that are
especially large for junior creditors.  Alternatively, they can attempt to reorganize and resuscitate the
firm, albeit risking total loss in the future.  Reorganization may be very difficult and contentious,
especially if incumbent management retains control rights while the reorganization proceeds.  In
contrast, shareholders almost always prefer to continue operating the firm because their upside potential
is unlimited while their downside losses are bounded by virtue of limited liability.
To simplify the analysis of creditor rights, LLSV (1998) adopt the perspective of a senior
secured lender.  They use four binary variables to proxy for creditor rights, including the following
(assigning a value of one if the answer is "yes" and zero if "no"):
4
  Is there an automatic stay on assets?
  Are secured creditors paid first?
  Are there restrictions for going into reorganization?
  Is management prevented from retaining operating control during reorganization?
LLSV (1998) sum these four binary indicators to form a broad index of creditor rights.  They also
check for the existence of a "remedial" mechanism that may compensate to some extent for weak
protection of creditors:
traditions indicate that the Scandinavian and German legal traditions are the most similar among all pairs.
4 See Table 1 of LLSV (1998) for a complete description of the underlying data series.13
  Is a legal reserve required, expressed as some percentage of capital?
A legal reserve requirement protects unsecured creditors, in particular, who might otherwise receive
nothing in a liquidation.
Creditor rights vary considerably across countries.  France is a prime example of a country with
very little legal protection of creditors, scoring zero on the LLSV broad index of creditor rights. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, French law imposes a legal reserve requirement (of 10 percent of capital) as
partial redress of the poor protection of creditors' rights otherwise.  At the other extreme, several
countries, including the United Kingdom, obtain a perfect score on the broad index of creditor rights. 
There is no legal reserve requirement in the U.K., presumably because creditors are well protected in
any case.
TABLE 4 HERE
The first row of Table 4 provides a crude summary ranking of the four country groups
according to their legal protection of creditor rights.  The average score of the English-origin group on
creditor rights dominates those of each of the other three groups in head-to-head comparisons (see
LLSV, 1998, Table 4, Panel B, for an explanation of the head-to-head comparisons).  The
German-origin group on average offers stronger protections to creditors than either the Scandinavian or
French groups, so we assign two stars to the German group.  The Scandinavian group may be slightly
more protective of creditor rights than the French group, but this is not entirely clear so we
conservatively assign one star to each of these groups.  Following LLSV (1998), our conclusion is that
common-law countries provide the best legal protection of creditor rights.  It remains to be seen how
well shareholders are legally protected in each country group and, even more importantly, how
consistently contracts and investor rights are actually upheld.  Without a climate in which the rule of
law prevails, investor rights are meaningless.14
Shareholder rights.  Company laws in force in a country largely determine the nature of
shareholders' voting rights, the ultimate source of value in corporate equity shares (Hart, 1995).  LLSV
(1998) identify six different types of shareholder rights that may or may not be present in any country. 
In addition, they create indexes for three other measures of shareholder rights that affect dividend
payouts and the conduct of annual meetings.  If present, each of the following six shareholder rights
provides an important investor guarantee:
5
  One share-one vote;
  Proxy voting by mail;
  Shares are not blocked before a general meeting;
  Cumulative voting or proportional representation (to allow minority interests to gain
representation on the board);
  An oppressed minority mechanism (allowing either judicial redress or a mandatory buyout
of shareholders who are opposed to fundamental changes in company bylaws, such as
voting rules);
  Pre-emptive rights to purchase new equity issues.
Each of these variables is coded zero if the right does not exist or one if it does exist for each country in
the sample.
In addition to these binary indicators, LLSV (1998) construct three other measures of
shareholder rights:
  Percentage of share capital needed to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting, where a
lower number signifies better shareholder rights;
  An index running from zero to six of "antidirector rights," consisting of the sum of scores
on all of the previous indicators except one share-one vote, and where a value of one is
5 See Table 1 of LLSV (1998) for a complete description of the underlying data series.15
assigned when any percentage of share capital less than 10 percent is needed to call an
extraordinary shareholder meeting;
  The percentage of net income that by law must be paid out as a dividend, if any.
As in the case of creditor rights, these indicators of shareholder rights reveal a vast diversity among
countries.  Among the rich countries, for example, Belgium (part of the French-origin group) scores
zero on every single indicator where this is possible except for the relatively high (and unfavorable to
minority shareholders) 20 percent of shares needed to call an extraordinary shareholders meeting.  At
the other extreme, Canada (assigned to the English-origin group by virtue of Ontario's dominant role in
the financial system) achieves a perfect score on six of eight measures of shareholder rights and a near-
perfect score on the ninth (only 5 percent of shares needed to call an extraordinary shareholders
meeting).
The second row of Table 4 provides a summary ranking of the four country groups according
to their legal protection of shareholder rights.  The average scores of the English-origin group again
dominate those of each of the other three groups in head-to-head comparisons (see LLSV, 1998, Table
2, Panel B); hence, we assign the English-origin group of countries three stars.  Despite the example of
Belgium noted above, the French-origin group on average offers stronger protections to shareholders
than either the Scandinavian or German groups, so we assign two stars to the French group.  The
Scandinavian group appears in head-to-head comparisons to be somewhat more protective of
shareholder rights than the German group, so we assign one star to the former and none to the latter.
Thus, the common-law countries appear to provide the strongest legal protection of both
creditor and shareholder rights.  If these were the only relevant dimensions of corporate governance, we
could stop at this point and recommend that all countries not in the English-origin group of countries
should simply copy one of its representatives.  LLSV (1998) argue that this would be a mistake,16
however.  Effective corporate governance requires not just a strong legal framework of investor
protections, but also a strong culture of rule of law.  It is to this vital consideration that we now turn.
The Rule of Law
Legal rights of shareholders and creditors to receive certain cash flows and to participate in
various corporate decision-making activities are necessary but not sufficient conditions for effective
corporate governance.  A climate of respect for the rule of law is also needed.  Conversely, the greatest
respect for and enforcement of the law are of no use to investors if they have few or inadequate legal
rights to enforce.  Thus, a core set of shareholder and creditor rights and an established tradition of
legal enforcement of these rights appear to be complementary features of an effective system of
corporate governance.
LLSV (1998) identify five "enforcement" variables that may proxy for the intangible degree of
the rule of law in a country.  In addition, they examine the quality of accounting standards in each
country.  The enforcement variables they investigate are the following:
6
  The efficiency of the judicial system, as ranked by Business International Corp.;
  An assessment of the law and order tradition, provided by International Country Risk, a
credit-rating agency;
  An index of government corruption, also from International Country Risk;
  The risk of expropriation, also from International Country Risk;
  The risk of repudiation of a contract by the government, also from International Country
Risk.
Each of these ratings is rescaled to lie between one and ten.  The authors also generated ratings of
accounting standards in each country by checking for the inclusion of 90 items in the 1990 annual
reports of at least three companies in each country.17
In contrast to the previously discussed cases of shareholder and creditor rights, the rule of law
appears to be consistently strong among the rich countries and somewhat weaker among poorer
countries.  As LLSV (1998) note, rule-of-law indicators may be strongly correlated with per-capita
GDP for more fundamental reasons than differing legal origins.  The rule of law may be both a cause
and an effect of a well-functioning economy and society.  Nevertheless, there are significant differences
between groups of countries sorted according to their respective legal origins.
The third row of Table 4 provides a summary ranking of the four country groups according to
their observance of the rule of law.  The average scores of the Scandinavian-origin group are highest on
these criteria, but it must be kept in mind that there are no poor countries in this group.  The
German-origin group on average obtains higher scores on the rule of law than either the English or
French groups, but this also may be related to the relative scarcity of low-income countries in the
German group.  Meanwhile, the English-origin countries score higher than the French-origin countries
with respect to law and order, and this result does not appear to be distorted by the mix of different
income levels among countries.
Legal Traditions and the Rule of Law as Corporate-Governance Indicators
What can we conclude about the importance of legal traditions and the rule of law in evaluating
corporate governance in major countries around the world?  The pioneering work of LLSV (1998)
documents a link between a country's legal tradition and its relative ranking in terms of providing rights
to shareholders and creditors and in fostering the rule of law (with the caveat that the latter also is
related strongly to the country's level of economic development).  Table 4 provides our interpretation of
LLSV's (1998) results in summary fashion.  We find that, on average according to a simple measure
that assigns equal importance to creditor rights, shareholder rights, and the rule of law, countries in the
common-law tradition appear to provide a better corporate-governance environment than countries that
6 See Table 1 of LLSV (1998) for a complete description of the underlying data series.18
have civil-law traditions.  Differences among the civil-law country groups do not appear as significant,
particularly given the large number of low- and middle-income countries in the French-origin group
that may depress this group's scores for reasons unrelated to corporate governance per se.
The connections identified by LLSV (1998) between legal traditions and corporate-governance
indicators fall short of a full explanation of corporate governance and its ramifications, however.  We
need to understand how the corporate-governance environment discussed above translates into specific
modes of financing and ownership.  Furthermore, we must seek to establish a link between these
objective measures of financial structure of firms and measures of ultimate performance, such as
profitability or growth.  Consequently, the next section explores the evidence regarding possible links
between a country's corporate-governance environment and the financial structure of its firms.  In
particular, we focus on the typical capital structures employed by firms and on the structure of
corporate ownership.
CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE OWNERSHIP
For present purposes, differences in legal traditions and the rule of law are important only if
they actually matter for corporate governance.  More specifically, differences in corporate-governance
institutions are of interest only if they translate into differences in objective measures of firm behavior. 
In this section, we focus on the impact of the previously discussed corporate-governance environment
on the sources of external finance used by firms in different countries and on the patterns of corporate
ownership.19
The Corporate-Governance Environment and Firms' Capital Structures
We first examine two aspects of the financing of large firms across countries:  (1) their typical
capital structure, that is, broad patterns on the liability side of firms' balance sheets, and (2) the relative
importance of external financing, that is, funds provided by parties who are not firm insiders.
Capital structure.  We provide two views of capital structure that correspond to a "macro"
view and a "micro" view of firms' balance sheets.  The advantages of the macro view from national
statistics are that we capture all firms in the economy and we can observe a large number of countries. 
The advantage of the micro view from firms' financial statements is that it provides a more detailed
look at balance-sheet items for a few important countries.
TABLE 5 HERE
Table 5 provides the macro view of capital structures in a large sample of countries.  Panel A of
Table 5, drawn from LLSV (1997a), shows the ratio of the debt of all firms to GDP in 1994 averaged
over all countries within each of the four legal traditions discussed above.  The numerator of this ratio
is the sum of bank debt of the private sector and outstanding non-financial sector bonds.  There is
essentially no difference between the common-law countries and the civil-law countries on this
dimension, a surprising finding given the much stronger protection of creditors in the English-origin
countries (recall the second row of Table 4).  Individual country detail (in the second row of panel A)
reveals that high-income countries tend to have larger debt-to-GDP ratios than low-income countries
sharing the same legal tradition, a point to which we will return later.  Another explanation for why
common-law countries do not have much larger debt-to-GDP ratios than civil-law countries is that other
sources of financing may be available more readily for example, equity.
Panel B of Table 5 breaks down the debt owed by the business sector into bank debt and
bond-market debt for each of the G-7 countries (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).  Although these data are
from the mid 1980s and bond markets have grown in virtually all major economies in the meantime, it20
is unlikely that the relative importance of bank debt has changed very much.  Simply put, firms in the
United States and Canada issue significant amounts of bonds but nowhere else in the G-7 countries is
this true.  The fact that British firms turn to banks for the vast majority of their debt financing indicates
that legal traditions are not primarily responsible for the unimportance of corporate bond markets
around the world.
Panel C of Table 5 shows the relative importance of equity markets around the world.  The
figures shown are estimates made by LLSV (1997a) of the ratio of the market value of outside
equity defined as the total market value of equity of the top ten firms in each country less the amount
controlled by the three largest shareholders in each to GDP.  In contrast to the measures of debt
shown in panels A and B, the relative importance of equity markets is indeed strongly related to legal
traditions.  Common-law countries have nearly twice the market capitalization of civil-law countries
except in the German-origin group, where the inclusion of East Asia is pivotal.  The surprisingly high
score of the German-origin group (46% of GDP) is due to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, whose
average equity-to-GDP ratio of 66 percent is more than double the three European members' average of
27 percent.
The overall picture we obtain from Table 5 is that common-law countries have much larger
markets for outside equity and, in some countries, also for corporate bonds.  Most external financing
done by firms in civil-law countries is in the form of bank loans, although banks are quite important in
common-law countries, too.
Financing by corporate insiders and outsiders.  The results in Table 5 provided some
indication of the unimportance of public equity and bond markets for most firms in civil-law countries.
 The unavoidable implication of having "underdeveloped" equity and bond markets is that most firms in
most countries are dependent on three sources of insider or near-insider financing:
  Owner-contributed funds;21
  Retained earnings;
  Bank debt.
Narrow capital markets in turn mean that fewer new firms are likely to emerge; existing firms may be
smaller or more financially fragile than would otherwise be the case; internal financing is likely to be
predominant and closely linked to the business cycle; inefficient forms of retained earnings may
emerge; banks may obtain unwelcome power over firms; and owners may remain relatively
undiversified.  We discuss the first five of these issues briefly here before turning to the structure of
corporate ownership in the next subsection.
TABLE 6 HERE
Table 6 presents indicators of how narrow capital markets may constrain the financial behavior
of firms.  Panel A contains two indicators of the ease with which firms may obtain external equity
financing.  The number of initial public offerings indicates the flow of new firms coming to the equity
market, while the number of domestic listed firms gives some idea of how broad the equity market has
become.  This reflects both the inflow of new firms as well as the outflow of existing firms that can no
longer operate profitably.  These two measures are very similar in pointing to a clear distinction
between the common-law and civil-law countries with respect to effective access to public equity
markets, although Scandinavian-origin countries resemble the common-law countries in this respect.
Panel B of Table 6 provides details on the mix of internal and external financing by non-
financial firms in the G-7 countries.  Firms in the civil-law countries generally must rely more on
internal sources of funds than their common-law counterparts, as indicated by slightly higher
percentages of total financing due to cash flows from operations in some cases.
Two special cases should be noted.  The United States presents an exception to our
generalization during the period Rajan and Zingales (1995) studied because a sizable portion of cash
flows at U.S. firms were dedicated to repurchasing their own equity (the same phenomenon has22
occurred in the 1990s).  The consequence is that, rather than constituting a source of funds, net equity
financing was a use of funds.  In fact, reliance on external debt by U.S. firms was not out of line with
their English-origin counterparts relative to overall cash flows, while the contribution of equity
financing was equivalent to nearly negative 8 percent of total financing in the U.S. versus positive 12-
14 percent for the U.K. and Canada (Rajan and Zingales, 1995, Table 4).  This results in a relatively
high reported percentage of total financing by U.S. firms from internal cash flows.  Subtracting 20
percentage points from the U.S. figure 8 percentage points of negative equity financing plus the
"normal" English-origin rate of net equity financing of 12 percentage points gives a figure of 57
percent, perfectly consistent with the numbers shown for Canada and the United Kingdom.
The second special case is Japan, which experienced an asset-price bubble during the late
1980s.  All kinds of financing were considered cheap by firms during this period so they may have
borrowed more and issued more equity than is "normal."  Hence, because of the market boom, Japan's
figure of 44 percent may be abnormally low and should not be used as prima facie evidence of low
reliance on internal sources of funds by firms in civil-law countries in general.
Firms in Germany, France, and Italy, meanwhile, obtained approximately 10 percentage points
less of their total financing from external sources than did firms in the U.K. and Canada.  This
constitutes more evidence that relatively narrow capital markets in the civil-law countries may have
constrained firms' financial behavior.
The second row of panel B shows the percentage of total assets financed by untaxed reserves or
"other" liabilities, which together may represent relatively inefficient sources of financing in the sense
that they are not priced by the market and are likely to be inflexible.  A massive 30.4 percent of German
firms' assets are financed by these special categories; the lion's share of these liabilities are pension
reserves (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).  In contrast to the common-law country "prudent-man" rules
dictating minimum off-balance sheet funding requirements for employee pension liabilities, German23
firms are allowed to fund their future pension obligations as well as financing their current
operations with on-balance sheet reserves.
The last consequence of narrow capital markets we discuss in this section is the power banks
may obtain over borrowing firms by virtue of their dominant role in external financing.  Table 5
showed that firms in civil-law countries rely to a great extent on banks for external finance.  It is
commonly asserted that banks in these countries wield a great deal of influence through a myriad of
financial activities that are grounded in a lending relationship (Rajan, 1992; Emmons and Schmid,
1998).  It is possible that the relatively large amount of internal financing done by firms in civil-law
countries reflects their attempts to minimize their dependence on banks.
We have shown in this section that the amount of debt financing by firms is similar among all
high-income countries.  A well-developed rule of law that may be a feature of high-income countries
probably contributes to this widely shared feature of corporate capital structure.  This regularity
obscures differences in details, however.  First, a few English-speaking countries have flourishing bond
markets, providing an alternative to banks for debt financing.  The strong protections of creditors'
interests found in the common-law countries may be an important factor contributing to the vitality of
public debt markets.  The continuing dependence of British firms on banks points out the fact that
creditor protections are necessary but not sufficient for bond markets to develop, however.  If creditor
protections are in fact important, however, then future bond-market development may be more likely in
German-origin countries than in other countries with civil-law traditions.
Second, many of the common-law countries have large equity markets in which outside
investors hold substantial stakes in firms.  These countries provide greater opportunities for firms to
obtain outside equity and stock-market listings and greater opportunities for investors to share
economy-wide risks.  With the exception of the East Asian countries, few civil-law countries have large24
and liquid equity markets.  Shareholder rights appear to be stronger in French-origin countries than in
the other civil-law countries, so equity markets may develop faster in the former group.
Third, civil-law countries finance a substantially larger part of their total operating
requirements with internal cash flows.  This could be due to weaker investor protections and the
consequent underdevelopment of external capital markets relative to common-law countries.  It could
also reflect firms' attempts to minimize the extent to which they rely on banks in order to maintain their
own bargaining power.
Together, these pieces of evidence on firms' capital structures suggest that bank domination of
external financing in civil-law countries may reduce firms' flexibility in some respects.  This aspect of
relatively underdeveloped capital markets must be kept in mind when evaluating some of the potential
benefits of bank-centered financial systems.  It may also be related to the existence of insider-oriented
governance structures and relatively concentrated equity ownership structures in many civil-law
countries, as the next subsection discusses.
The Corporate-Governance Environment and Ownership Structure
The number and nature of investors in a corporation and the relative sizes of their stakes are
important features of the ownership structure of corporations.  We now turn to evidence on differences
across countries and legal traditions in terms of:  (1) the locus of effective control by shareholders, (2)
concentration of equity ownership, and (3) the identity of controlling shareholders.
TABLE 7 HERE
Control of large public firms.  A common assumption among economists and management
scholars is that large firms are widely held, i.e., the shares are dispersed among many investors, each
with an insignificant fraction of the total and no way of exerting control over the management.  This25
has lead to large theoretical and empirical literatures dealing with managerial agency problems and the
inefficiencies these create.
Panel A of Table 7 shows that dispersed ownership is a good approximation of reality in only
some countries.  Using a definition of effective control of 20 percent ownership or more by a single
entity at the end of 1995, LLS (1999) found that only 36 percent of a sample of large firms drawn from
27 countries had no effective owner, i.e., were widely held.  If a cutoff level of stakes amounting to 10
percent or more is applied, only 24 percent of firms in the sample were widely held.  Large firms in the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan are almost all widely held, but other high-income
countries are just about as likely to be controlled by one shareholder as to be without a dominant owner.
 Widely held firms are virtually unknown in some middle-income countries such as Mexico and
Argentina, while in 17 of the 27 sample countries, a majority of large firms were controlled by a single
owner (LLS, 1999, Table 2).  Thus, we have some evidence that ownership is concentrated in many
large firms, especially outside the English-speaking world.  This feature of equity ownership structure
may be a response to the lack of investor protections in many civil-law countries noted above (LLSV,
1998).
Concentration of ownership.  We can also examine the ownership concentration of a small
number of large owners to seek more evidence on concentrated ownership.  After all, effective control
could be exerted by a small group of shareholders rather than by a single owner.  Panel B of Table 7
provides evidence of a high degree of concentration of ownership among the three largest shareholders
in large firms in many countries (LLSV, 1998, Table 7).  Consistent with the results shown in panel A
of Table 7, the least-concentrated ownership structures appear to be those in the English-speaking
world and Japan.
Within the English-origin group of countries, there is a very strong negative correlation
between an individual country's per-capita income level and the degree to which ownership is26
concentrated in its large firms.  That is, richer countries have more widely held firms.  A similar, but
weaker, pattern appears among the French-origin countries.  Thus, if concentrated ownership is a
response to weak investor protections, then our earlier conclusion that common-law countries have
stronger investor protections than civil-law countries is consistent with the ownership patterns we
observe among the rich countries.  A second, income-related, effect appears to be operating, as well. 
Within any country group, richer countries have more widely held firms than other countries (see panel
A of Table 7).  This may reflect our conclusion that the rule of law, an important complement of
explicit legal investor protections, is stronger in richer countries of all legal traditions. 
Identity of owners.  Given a high degree of concentrated equity ownership in many countries,
we can ask who these owners are.  Panels C and D of Table 7 provide details on the types of major
shareholders observed in large firms in several countries at the end of 1995.  The fraction of large firms
controlled by a family, the State, or a widely held nonfinancial firm is typically around one half or more
in all but the high-income English-speaking countries and Japan (panel C).  For example, one of the 10
largest nonfinancial firms in Germany was controlled by a family and three others were controlled by
the State (in one of which control was shared with a widely held financial firm).  In South Korea, two
of the 10 largest firms were controlled by families and two others by the State.  In Mexico, all 10 of the
largest firms were family-controlled.  At the other extreme, all 10 of the U.K.'s largest firms were
widely held when a 20 percent definition of control is used and 9 of 10 still qualify when a 10 percent
cutoff is applied (LLS, 1999, Table 2).
Panel D of Table 7 focuses on control of large nonfinancial firms by widely held financial
firms that is, banks, insurance companies, or other financial institutions that are not closely held or
controlled by other entities.  This definition includes many of the German, Dutch, and Swiss universal
banks, and the Japanese city banks, for example, although it does not cover the French or Italian banks
in which the State maintains a large equity position.27
Do large banks exert a great deal of control over large nonfinancial firms in some countries? 
The evidence from LLS (1999) is that bank control is the exception rather than the rule even in Europe,
the home of universal banking.  Private German, Swiss, Scandinavian, Italian, and French financial
institutions control only one or two of the 10 largest domestic nonfinancial firms in each country.  As
expected, this form of control is nonexistent in the high-income English-speaking world.  Perhaps
surprisingly to some, Japanese financial institutions are also absent from the list of effective owners of
large nonfinancial firms.
Our discussion of equity ownership structure across countries provided some evidence
consistent with the idea that concentrated ownership may be a response to weak investor protections (in
the rich civil-law countries) and/or to a weak climate for the rule of law (in low-income countries of all
legal traditions).  We saw that it is families, the State, and other nonfinancial firms, rather than banks or
other financial institutions, that provide the bulk of concentrated equity investment in the largest firms.
DOES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFFECT CORPORATE PERFORMANCE?
Our argument to this point has been built up in two stages.  First, we argued that different legal
traditions contribute to notable differences in the degree of investor protection written into the
commercial codes of various countries.  At the same time, higher levels of economic development
correlate with a better climate for the rule of law.  The second stage in our argument was that these two
dimensions of a country's historical, legal, and political legacy are critical determinants of the actual
financial structures used by firms.  In particular, we found that nonfinancial firms in common-law
countries generally used more external finance than their counterparts in civil-law countries.  Both
outside equity (i.e., contributed by non-controlling shareholders) and bond-market debt were more
plentiful in English-origin countries, on average.  Consistent with these findings, we found that firms
were more likely to have controlling shareholders and that ownership structures were more28
concentrated outside the English-speaking world and Japan.  Although banks are dominant providers of
debt finance in most countries, they act as controlling shareholders in only a few of the largest
nonfinancial firms in the civil-law countries.
We now turn to the third and final stage in our argument.  In this section we ask, Do the legal
traditions and patterns of corporate governance sketched so far have any significance for corporate
performance?  Furthermore, do these firm-level differences in performance, if any, translate into
differences in the performance of national economies?
It is worth noting that we have already presented one suggestive piece of evidence that bears on
these questions.  Table 1 reported differences in the pre-tax ROAs of large internationally active banks
from 12 countries.  The tentative conclusion from our earlier discussion was that banks from
English-speaking countries appeared to enjoy consistently higher levels of core profitability than did
other banks.  In light of our subsequent discussion, it is plausible to assert that differing
corporate-governance practices may be in part responsible.  We now turn to more comprehensive
sources of empirical evidence that might confirm this conjecture.
Evidence on the Links Between Corporate Governance, Corporate Finance, and Corporate
Performance
We will review briefly evidence from industry-level data as well as from national accounts.  An
empirical investigation at industry level allows a finer partitioning of the data and a larger sample size,
important considerations when testing theories that may be difficult to distinguish  This is certainly the
case here, since corporate-governance explanations of corporate or national economic performance may
not be obviously more convincing than a reverse-causation explanation, according to which good
performance leads to more external finance, for example.  The national-accounts data are important29
because they are capable, in principle, of picking up all of the indirect and possibly intangible ways in
which corporate-governance systems may matter for overall economic performance.
An industry-level view of corporate governance and corporate performance.  Rajan and
Zingales (1998) begin with a simple maintained hypothesis:  firms in industries that require relatively
large amounts of external finance to succeed will perform relatively better in countries where financial
markets are better developed.  First, they estimate the amount of external financing as a fraction of
capital expenditures actually used by all the manufacturing firms in the Compustat universe for the
United States.  They find that Drugs and Pharmaceuticals firms use the most external finance, followed
by Plastics and Computing.  The sectors with the least need for external finance in fact, these sectors
have a negative need, or excess cash flow are Leather, Pottery, and Tobacco.
Armed with estimates from U.S. firms of external financing needs by industrial sector, Rajan
and Zingales (1998) then apply these financial-dependence measures to 36 industries drawn from 41
countries.  They use several proxies for the level of a country's financial development, including
accounting standards (their preferred measure), the ratio of total stock-market capitalization to GDP, the
ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP, per-capita income, and the LLSV (1998) country
groupings.  Their empirical tests consist of regressions of the growth of real value added by industries
in each country on measures of financial development by country.
Consistent with the hypothesis that corporate governance as we have articulated it matters for
corporate performance, Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that firms in industries that require large
amounts of external financing grow faster in countries with high scores on their measures of financial
development (their Tables 4 and 5).  The results are almost identical when they use the LLSV (1998)
country classification scheme instead of their own financial-development measures to gauge how easily
firms can access sources of external finance.  Thus, corporate governance appears to matter for
corporate performance in the way one would expect.  Better accounting standards, larger capital30
markets, stronger legal protections of investors, and a stronger rule of law are all good predictors of
growth by firms that need external finance.
National economic performance and corporate governance.  Another strategy for detecting
possible effects of corporate governance on corporate performance is to compare measures of national
economic performance while controlling for governance proxies.  In a series of papers, Ross Levine
(1998, 1999; Levine and Zervos, 1998) has shown that numerous indicators of financial
development including the LLSV (1998) country groupings discussed above are strong predictors
of several measures of aggregate economic outperformance.  This is also consistent with the hypothesis
that corporate-governance practices are important inputs into corporate performance which, in turn, is
related to national performance.
Levine and Zervos (1998, Table 3) find that G.D.P. growth, growth of the capital stock, and
productivity growth are all strongly associated with several measures of financial development over the
period 1976-93 in a sample of 47 countries.  These include the ratio of bank credit extended to the
private sector to GDP and the ratio of stock-market turnover to market capitalization, proxies for the
ease of access to debt and equity markets, respectively.  These results are robust to the inclusion of
various controls for the level of economic development of each country.
Levine (1998) repeats the analysis done in Levine and Zervos (1998) but uses the LLSV (1998)
country-classification scheme to motivate his search for specific measures of financial-market
development.  In particular, Levine (1998) uses the LLSV (1998) measures to extract the component of
bank credit to the private sector that is due to (i.e., correlated with) these corporate-governance features
alone.  Levine (1999) uses a similar methodology with several broader measures of financial
development.  In both cases, the results are strongly supportive of the hypothesis that the elements of
corporate governance identified by LLSV (1998) are in fact important determinants of aggregate
economic performance over long time periods.  In other words, the corporate-governance  environment31
can make a measurable difference not only to individual corporate performance, but also to national
economic performance.
A Broader Perspective on Corporate Performance
Despite strong support for the common-law framework of corporate governance that emerges
from the performance studies just described, there may be reasons why there appears to be no
international rush to jetison existing frameworks where they differ from the English-origin model.  Is
this due merely to national chauvinism or the inability to recognize a superior model?  Or are the issues
surrounding corporate governance more complex than might have been inferred from our previous
discussions?
The persistence of distinctive systems of corporate governance could be due to the existence of
other important aspects of corporate governance and corporate performance that are not reflected
adequately in the profitability and growth regressions reported by Rajan and Zingales (1998), Levine
and Zervos (1998), and Levine (1998, 1999).  For example, common-law countries' financial systems
may be proficient in fostering "creative destruction," but some countries may choose a milder if also
less profitable form of capitalism.  Some countries may enjoy comparative advantages in industries
that do not require large amounts of external finance, reducing the attraction of large and liquid capital
markets.  Active capital markets may interfere with various kinds of financial intermediary-based
long-term relationships that provide efficient monitoring of nonfinancial firms (Hellwig, 1991) or
allocative efficiency (Allen and Gale, 1999).  Capital markets that provide "transactional finance" may
undermine financial intermediaries' ability to provide socially beneficial intertemporal smoothing of
risk (Allen and Gale, 1997) or to resist credit cycles that result in macroeconomic stability (Kiyotaki
and Moore, 1997).  We turn briefly to these qualifications to our previous conclusion that common-law
based corporate-governance systems appear to produce superior performance.32
The role of financial intermediaries in monitoring nonfinancial firms.  We alluded earlier
to the role of financial firms such as banks and insurance companies in exerting control and monitoring
the behavior of nonfinancial firms.  Clearly, ownership of a controlling equity stake is not the only, or
perhaps even the best, way for a financial institution to provide incentives for managers to act in the
interests of investors in the firm.  A lending relationship is also a potential source of discipline
(Diamond, 1984).  As we noted, bank lending is the primary source of debt financing in virtually all
countries, but it is relatively less important in a few of the English-speaking countries.  It is precisely in
these countries where bond and outside equity markets are most active.  Based on a comparison of the
United States and Germany, Hellwig (1991) argues that active capital markets "serve investors who
want to reshuffle their portfolios," but do not provide a substitute for the disciplining role of banks that
closely monitor their borrowers.  Jensen (1993) concurs by observing that the profusion of hostile
takeover activity in the United States may be a sign that, in the absense of strong lenders, external
capital markets and internal control mechanisms often have failed to serve investors well.
The role of financial intermediaries in producing allocative efficiency.  Innovation often
involves creativity, entrepreneurial drive, and long-sighted financing.  Financial intermediaries such as
banks and venture-capital firms appear to be indispensable in providing opportunities for profitable
innovation and efficient allocation of society's resources (Allen and Gale, 1999).  Active capital
markets may indeed play an important role at a later stage in a new firm's life cycle, but financial
intermediaries are more important in early stages.  Analogously, intermediaries that monitor firms
closely are better able to initiate restructurings or liquidation when this is called for.  To the extent that
capital markets are able to "skim the cream" of profitable investment projects and firms, financial
intermediaries may be weakened and their role in producing allocative efficiency undermined.
The role of financial intermediaries in providing intertemporal smoothing of risk.  From
the standpoint of an economy as a whole, market-dominated financial systems may be efficient in a33
cross-sectional sense (i.e., funds are auctioned to the highest-value bidder) even when they are not
efficient in an intertemporal sense (i.e., avoiding booms and busts, Allen and Gale, 1997).  The source
of this apparent paradox is that the liquidity created by financial markets is a public good, leading to
overconsumption of the good.  That is, every participant faces the incentive to economize on holding
"safe assets" when financial markets appear able to provide liquidity on demand.  However, large
shocks to asset values or confidence may induce an abnormally large number of investors to seek to
convert risky into safe assets at one time.  This flight to safety reveals the ephemeral nature of the
liquidity provided by markets.  Financial systems that reserve a large (and profitable) role for financial
intermediaries, on the other hand, provide incentives for these intermediaries to invest in safe assets so
as to provide a genuine store of liquidity.  Thus, economies that allow capital markets to reduce the
profitability of financial intermediaries too much may run a greater risk of acute liquidity crises.
A related idea is that lending based solely on collateral as opposed to relationship lending
can lead to destructuve credit cycles in an economy (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997).  When assets serve
both as means of production and loan collateral, shocks to the value of the assets has two effects.  First,
by definition the shock reduces the productivity of the assets and hence the incomes of borrowers.  The
second, and potentially more damaging, effect is that loan collateral values shrink.  Lending that is
based solely on these collateral values, rather than stable long-term relationships, then declines.  This
also reduces income, reinforcing the first effect.  Clearly, the Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) account is
related to the Allen and Gale (1997) scenario in the sense that there is a public-goods problem.  In both
cases, the existence of financial intermediaries with some degree of market power allows them to
internalize and hence to eliminate this source of fragility in a market economy.34
CONCLUSIONS
We have argued that distinctive legal traditions, based on common law and civil law, gave rise
to distinctive sets of legal protections of investors.  In addition, the climate surrounding enforcement of
contracts, the rule of law, appears to correlate with countries' levels of economic development.
Taken together, the degree of investor protection and the strength of the rule of law appear to
explain differences in the capital structures of firms and ownership patterns across countries.  Finally,
we provided evidence that better investor protection and a stronger rule of law are related both to better
corporate performance of firms that require external finance and to several measures of aggregate
economic outperformance.
These conclusions should not be taken to imply that there is a single, universally accepted
model of superior corporate governance.  Systems continue to differ significantly.  We suggested that
the issues surrounding a country's choice of corporate-governance system are complex and there are
legitimate objections to a financial system dominated by capital markets.  In the end, we can say only
that corporate-governance systems are deeply entrenched and corporate performance is too multifaceted
to allow unambiguous recommendations for future change and reforms.  Nevertheless, stronger legal
protections of creditors and shareholders and a strong commitment to the rule of law appear to be
no-lose propositions that every country can and should embrace.35
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Table 1
Profitability of Large Banks
Panel A.  Average pre-tax return on assets (ROA), 1986-88
Group average 0.89% 0.54% 0.70% 0.76%
Individual countries
United States    0.70%
U.K.                  0.97%
Canada             1.02%
Sweden              0.77%
Denmark           0.31%
Germany           0.83%
Japan                0.60%
Switzerland       0.68%
France              0.32%
Italy                  0.72%
Netherlands      0.71%
Spain                1.29%
Panel B.  Average pre-tax return on assets (ROA), 1996-98
Group average 1.32% 0.98% 0.05% 0.59%
Individual countries
United States    1.67%
U.K.                  1.13%
Canada             1.15%
Sweden              1.02%
Denmark           0.94%
Germany           0.48%
Japan               -0.43%
Switzerland       0.10%
France              0.32%
Italy                  0.34%
Netherlands      0.74%
Spain                0.97%
Panel C.  Average pre-tax return on assets (ROA) over both periods
Group average 1.11% 0.76% 0.38% 0.68%
Individual countries
United States    1.19%
U.K.                  1.05%
Canada             1.08%
Sweden              0.90%
Denmark           0.63%
Germany           0.65%
Japan                0.09%
Switzerland       0.39%
France              0.32%
Italy                  0.53%
Netherlands      0.72%
Spain                1.13%
Sources:  Panel A, OECD (1992); panel B, OECD (1999b); panel C, authors' calculations.38
Table 2
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
Topic Principle Comments
I.  The rights of shareholders The corporate governance framework should protect
shareholders' rights.
General conceptual framework for establishing
shareholders' property rights.  Recognizes the inevitable
separation of ownership and control in widely held
firms but does not propose specific approaches to
solving the agency problem.  Does not argue for one
share-one vote rules but advocates transparent takeover
markets.
II.  The equitable treatment of
shareholders
The corporate governance framework should ensure the
equitable treatment of all shareholders, including
minority and foreign shareholders.  All shareholders
should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress
for violation of their rights.
Stresses the importance of protecting the rights of
minority and foreign shareholders.  Does not take a
position on the desirability of one share-one vote rules. 
Major thrust is on better disclosure and information
flows to shareholders.
III.  The role of stakeholders in
corporate governance
The corporate governance framework should recognise
the rights of stakeholders as established by law and
encourage active co-operation between corporations and
stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the
sustainability of financially sound enterprises.
Covers employees, suppliers, creditors, and all other
non-shareholder individuals and groups with an interest
in some aspect of the performance of a corporation's
obligations.  No inevitable conflict is recognized
between shareholders and other stakeholders.
IV.  Disclosure and
transparency
The corporate governance framework should ensure that
timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material
matters regarding the corporation, including the
financial situation, performance, ownership, and
governance of the company.
Endorses the maximum practicable flow of information
to shareholders.  Implies that shareholders' property
rights (ought to) extend to insiders' material
information about the firm.
V.  The responsibilities of the
board
The corporate governance framework should ensure the
strategic guidance of the company, the effective
monitoring of management by the board, and the board's
accountability to the company and the shareholders.
Argues that independence from management is
necessary for a board to carry out its responsibilities
effectively.  In addition to serving as shareholders'
representatives, the board's responsibilities include
relations with stakeholders and the public at large.
Source:  OECD (1999a).39
Table 3
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) Country Classification Scheme:




English origin Scandinavian origin German origin French origin
OECD member
countries


















































Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998, Table 2)40
Table 4




English origin Scandinavian origin German origin French origin
Creditor rights *** * ** *
Shareholder rights *** * **
Rule of law * *** **
Total 7 5 4 3
Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998, Tables 2, 4, and 5).  One asterisk is assigned to a country group for each other
country group with inferior scores in a head-to-head comparison on this dimension.41
Table 5




English origin Scandinavian origin German origin French origin
Panel A.  Ratio of debt owed by the business sector to GDP (1994).
Group average 68% 57% 97% 45%
Examples
United States    81%
Canada             72%
Singapore         60%
Sweden              55%
Denmark           34%
Germany         112%
Japan              122%
South Korea      74%
France              96%
Italy                  55%
Mexico              47%
Panel B.  Fraction of the business sector's debt owed to banks (1986).
Examples
United States     75%
Canada              86%
U.K                    96%
Germany         99.8%
Japan                 96%
France              93%
Italy                  98%
Panel C.  Ratio of the market value of outside equity capital to GDP (1994).
Group average 60% 30% 46% 21%
Examples
United States    58%
Canada             72%
Singapore        118%
Sweden              51%
Denmark           21%
Germany           13%
Japan                62%
South Korea      44%
France              23%
Italy                    8%
Mexico              22%
Sources:  Panels A and C, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997a, Table 2); panel B, Rajan and Zingales (1995, Table 8).42
Table 6




English origin Scandinavian origin German origin French origin
Panel A.  Number of new and existing firms (1994-96).
Initial Public Offerings
per 1,000,000 people
2.23 2.14 0.12 0.19
Domestic listed firms
per 1,000 people
35.45 27.26 16.79 10.00
Panel B.  Reliance on internal financing (1984-91).
Percentage of total
financing due to cash
flows from operations
United States      77%
Canada              58%
U.K.                   51%
Germany             67%
Japan                  44%
France              65%





United States      5.8%
Canada              2.6%
U.K.                   3.4%
Germany            30.4%
Japan                   4.8%
France              6.3%
Italy                  7.8%






English origin Scandinavian origin German origin French origin
Panel A.  Control:  Fraction of 10 Largest Nonfinancial Domestic Firms that are Widely Held (20% definition of
control).
Examples
United States     80%
U.K.                 100%
Canada             60%
Singapore         15%
Sweden               25%
Denmark            40%
Norway              25%
Finland             35%
Germany           50%
Switzerland       60%
Japan                90%
South Korea      55%
France               60%
Italy                   20%
Mexico                0%
Argentina           0%
Panel B.  Concentration:  Median Ownership of 10 Largest Nonfinancial Domestic Firms by Three Largest
Shareholders.
Group average 42% 33% 33% 55%
Examples
United States     12%
U.K.                  15%
Canada             24%
Singapore         53%
Sweden                28%
Denmark             40%
Norway              31%
Finland              34%
Germany           50%
Switzerland       48%
Japan                13%
South Korea      20%
France              24%
Italy                  60%
Mexico              67%






English origin Scandinavian origin German origin French origin
Panel C.  Fraction of 10 Largest Nonfinancial Domestic Firms Controlled by a Family, the State, or a Widely Held
Nonfinancial Firm (20% definition of control).
Examples
United States     20%
U.K.                    0%
Canada             40%
Singapore         80%
Sweden                55%
Denmark             50%
Norway               60%
Finland               50%
Germany           35%
Switzerland       30%
Japan                10%
South Korea      40%
France              35%
Italy                  65%
Mexico             100%
Argentina          95%
Panel D  Fraction of 10 Largest Nonfinancial Domestic Firms Controlled by a Widely Held Financial Firm or
"Miscellaneous" (20% definition of control).
Examples
United States       0%
U.K.                     0%
Canada                0%
Singapore            5%
Sweden                 20%
Denmark              10%
Norway               15%
Finland               15%
Germany           15%
Switzerland       10%
Japan                  0%
South Korea        5%
France                  5%
Italy                    15%
Mexico                 0%
Argentina             5%
Sources:  Panels A, C, and D, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999, Table 2); panel B, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1998, Table 7).